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1. INTRODUCTION / BACKGROUND 
 
The HI – HUMAID Project 
With prior programming experience in Guinea-Bissau and significant Mine Action 
experience internationally, Handicap International – France (HI) was awarded €600,000 
through EuropeAid’s Appeal 117489 / C / G / Multi (2003/04) toward a 15-month 
partnership project with the Bissau-Guinean NGO, Humanitarian Aid (HUMAID), entitled:  
Bissau sans mines ni UXOs – Projet de renforcement des capacites locales d’action 
contre les mines et les UXOs en Guinee Bissau, hereinafter referred to in English as  
Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau.1  The EC contribution 
represented 81% of the total budget of €738,057.   
 
The general objectives of the project, covering the period January 1, 2005 to March 31, 
2006, were 1) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Mine Action in Guinea-
Bissau and in so doing, 2) to reduce the threat of landmines and UXOs in the urban and 
peri-urban areas of Bissau, the capital of Guinea-Bissau (where 30% of the country’s 
population of approximately 1.6 million reside).   
 
Specifically the project sought to strengthen local capacity for Mine Action in accordance 
with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) through budget support, technical 
assistance and accompaniment to HUMAID.  The project was to benefit HUMAID’s 77 
staff members (deminers, other field staff, administrative and management personnel), 
and indirectly, the population of Bissau whose livelihoods would improve as a result of 
the reduced threat from landmines and UXO. In the end, direct beneficiaries also 
included deminers of LUTCAM, the one other mine clearance NGO in Guinea Bissau 
whose deminers participated in HI-facilitated technical training, and the staff of the 
national Mine Action coordinating body, CAAMI, who benefited from on-the-ground 
technical expertise provided by HI advisors. 
 
The Landmine / UXO problem in Guinea-Bissau 
Guinea-Bissau’s landmine and UXO contamination can be traced to three conflicts: 
 the war of Independence from Portugal (1963 to1974), when landmines were used 
to defend Portuguese military installations, and were also laid around the military 
headquarters of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and 
Cape Verde), and along the border with Guinea Conakry;  
 the 1998/99 civil war affecting primarily the capital Bissau and surrounding areas, 
where the frontline extended 11 km through residential areas, cashew orchards and 
industrial infrastructure. Government forces comprised of mostly Senegalese and 
Guinea Conakry military reinforcements laid mines in a defensive measure against 
the Bissau-Guinean Junta which controlled the airport and access to the interior of 
the country. An estimated 190,000 people, or 54% of the population of Bissau, were 
said to be directly affected by this mine threat2.  Moreover, the frontline 
neighborhoods of Bissau were densely littered with thousands of UXOs, due in large 
                                                
1 The original project title was in French and a number of slightly different English and Portuguese 
translations have been used in project documents.   
2 Estimate of affected population taken from HUMAID’s fundraising appeal letter written by John Blacken 
(September 2005). 




part to the explosion of a suburban armory during the war. As well, four areas in the 
south of the country are also known to have been mined during this conflict;  
 and thirdly, the on-going low-level conflict in Senegal’s Casamance region between 
the Government of Senegal and the Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de 
la.Casamance (MFDC) affecting the northern border zone of Guinea-Bissau.   
 
From 2003 to mid 2004, 41 people were killed or injured by mines and UXOs in Guinea-
Bissau bringing the total number of registered victims from 1963 to mid 2004 to 6653.  Of 
note is the fact that registered victims can be found in all regions of the country, with 
35% in the north, 21% in the east, 19% in the south and 25% in Bissau town4. 
Approximately 25% of all victims, including the most recent victims, have been the result 
of UXO incidents5, highlighting the particular need to include EOD in capacity-building 
strategies and in clearance priorities.  
 
HUMAID and Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau 
HUMAID was founded in 2000 by a Canadian resident in Bissau, Elaine Grimson, and a 
small group of war veterans to address the imminent threat posed by mines and UXOs 
in the city of Bissau. Just days after HUMAID was created, Elaine Grimson died 
unexpectedly and the remaining founders of HUMAID asked John Blacken, a former US 
Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, also resident in Bissau, to lead the organization.  With 
no initial funding, limited materials and equipment, and rudimentary techniques,  
HUMAID began identifying and marking mine and UXO contamination in Bissau, and 
clearing mines and UXO. Thus, was the start of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
Guinea-Bissau signed the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 and ratified it in 2001, providing a 
legal impetus for Mine Action.  And in 2001, the National Mine Action Coordination 
Centre (CAAMI) was established under the authority of the inter-ministerial National 
Commission for Humanitarian Demining (CNDH).  The CAAMI is responsible for 
implementing the National Mine Action Program (PAAMI) which serves as the 
programmatic framework for Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
Since its inception, UNDP has provided budget support, technical assistance and in-
house expatriate advisors to the CAAMI. 
 
In 2002, UNDP created LUTCAM as the operational arm of the CAAMI to carry out 
clearance tasks, ostensibly with a vision towards eventual semi-independence as a 
national NGO.  It is not clear whether the decision by UNDP to create a new operational 
structure was intended to increase the operational capacity beyond just HUMAID hoping 
the necessary funding would materialize, or was a move to establish an alternative to 
HUMAID, knowing full-well there would be limited resources in the medium term to 
maintain two separate clearance organizations.  
 
The coordination of clearance tasks was centralized in the CAAMI, though to-date no 
formal accreditation process for operational partners has been established.   And lacking 
its own National Operating Standards, the CAAMI has referred to Mozambican and 
Angolan interpretations of the IMAS as a guide for the application of international 
standards in Guinea-Bissau. 
                                                
3 Guinea-Bissau National Plan for Completion 2005-2009 (May 2005). 
4 HUMAID”s fundraising appeal letter written by John Blacken (September 2005). 
5 Guinea-Bissau National Plan for Completion 2005-2009 (May 2005). 





Until 2003, when LUTCAM began operations, HUMAID was the lone operator in 
clearance activities in Guinea-Bissau.  HUMAID had by then received donor support 
from the UK, Sweden, France, Germany, the US, and UNDP totaling some $1.27 million 
over four years. With this support HUMAID claims to have cleared 396,236 m2, and 
removed 2,480 anti-personnel landmines, 53 anti-tank mines, 144 anti-boat mines, 
13,719 large UXOs (> 12.77 mm) and 10,000 kg of spent bullets and other metals from 
the ground by the end of 2003 (refer to ANNEX F (b) – HUMAID’s Cumulative Results 
2000-2005)6.  
 
By 2004, the combined clearance capacity of HUMAID and LUTCAM had reached some 
100 manual deminers with total production averaging 10,000 m2 per month in Bissau7.   
LUTCAM was funded and managed by UNDP through the CAAMI, and HUMAID was 
operating as an independent NGO, with a 2004 annual budget of approximately 
$500,000 funded entirely by the German Government through Caritas, a Catholic relief 
organization.   
 
In Bissau, 17 urban and peri-urban areas had been identified and marked by HUMAID 
and LUTCAM with an approximate size of 6.5 million m2 - of which HUMAID claims to 
have cleared 511,530 m2 by the end of 20048.   Although 21 additional areas in the 
interior of the country were known to be mined, including four areas linked to the 
1998/99 conflict (though no impact or technical survey has to date been carried out to 
confirm the extent of the contamination), both LUTCAM and HUMAID have worked 
exclusively in Bissau.  The CAAMI has made it clear that only after Bissau was 
completed would clearance activities move out into the rest of the country. Moreover, 
neither HUMAID nor LUTCAM have the logistical capacity to venture outside Bissau. 
 
Until 2004, relations between the CAAMI and UNDP, on the one side, and HUMAID on 
the other, were characterized by high levels of tension and as a result national 
coordination was less effective9.   
 
                                                
6 These figures are taken from HUMAID monthly reports to the CAAMI.  Prior to 2003, HUMAID was 
registering only UXOs larger than 12.77 mm in the UXO count and all other metals removed in the 
category of Other Metals Removed (by kg).  In 2003, The CAAMI instructed HUMAID to begin to count 
spent bullets and other small metal fragments from UXOs in the UXO count.  Note also that there are some 
discrepancies in HUMAID’s production data from one document to another (as outlined in Annex E (b) – 
HUMAID’s Cumulative Results 2000-2005, and no verified / official figures available from HI or the 
CAAMI. 
7 Figure taken from the Guinea-Bissau National Plan for the Completion Initiative 2005-2009, prepared by 
UNDP-Guinea-Bissau (May 2005). 
8 Estimate of the total contamination in Bissau town and total area cleared by HUMAID taken from 
HUMAID documents.   
9 HUMAID followed CAAMI directives begrudgingly, convinced they were being made to clear low-
priority areas with relatively minor landmine and UXO contamination in an effort to discredit the 
organization vis-à-vis HUMAID’s donors and to build support for LUTCAM in an increasingly 
competitive funding environment.  Though institutional relations between the CAAMI and HUMAID are 
considerably improved at present, due in part to HI’s efforts to promote more effective coordination, old 
resentments and distrust linger.  
 
 




In 2004, the UNDP included Guinea-Bissau in its Completion Initiative – aimed at 
mobilizing donor support towards “finishing the job” in those countries with relatively 
small landmine / UXO contamination and where it should be possible - with targeted 
donor support - to definitively take care of the problem. Guinea-Bissau later produced its 
own National Plan for Completion (May 2005) dependent on the combined operational 
capacity of HUMAID and LUTCAM (or some variation of the equivalent). 
 
Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau takes place in the challenging context of extreme poverty 
– with the country ranking as the 6th poorest in the world, massive debt, an economy 
heavily dependent on foreign aid, a lack of natural resources and infrastructure, and a 
high level of political instability.  The overthrow of long-time President Joao “Nino” Vieira 
in 1999 was followed by a succession of governments. And, in August 2005, Nino Vieira 
was returned to power in a presidential election that promised to re-establish political 
stability in the country. The sacking of a rival Prime Minister and subsequent political in-
fighting over the final months of 2005 have once again raised concerns of on-going 
instability.  These factors, combined with low levels of state capacity and high levels of 
corruption have driven those few donors potentially interested in Guinea-Bissau to a 
stand-off position.  
 
Project Justification 
It was in this international and national context that HI envisioned an initiative to build 
HUMAID’s capacity in mine / UXO clearance to international standards, while also 
strengthening HUMAID’s organizational performance, in line with HI’s strategy to 
develop national capacities in Mine Action.   
 
By 2004 HUMAID had come a long way from the rag-tag group of go-getter veterans 
who in 2000 began prodding for landmines and picking up rockets outside any known 
safety standards or acceptable practice.  The organization had secured over a million 
US dollars to fund humanitarian clearance operations since 2000 without external 
accompaniment, had benefited from short-term training and technical assistance from 
Dutch, Australian and Mozambican trainers, and had acquired basic protective gear and 
clearance equipment. HUMAID followed the directives and priorities established by the 
CAAMI (however begrudgingly) and clearance operations were carried out without 
incident. The organization had established itself as a credible and committed player in 
Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.   
 
HUMAID had undeniably progressed but most agreed there was more to be done to 
professionalize HUMAID’s clearance capacity as per IMAS10. HI was well-positioned to 
provide the kinds of technical and organizational supports required. As such HUMAID 
was the obvious, and arguably the most strategic choice of local partners for HI. 
 
In granting HI 600,000 Euros for the project Building Local Mine Action Capacity in 
Guinea-Bissau, the EC responded to the well documented need for continued clearance 
operations in Guinea-Bissau towards Completion objectives, while at the same time 
reinforcing and professionalizing an already existing local operator in-line with its 2002-
2004 Mine Action Strategy and the not yet written 2005-2007 Mine Action Strategy – the 
European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target.  
 
                                                
10 Handicap International, CAAMI, and others all recognized that clearance practices prior to the HI 
partnership project were not in line with IMAS. HUMAID field staff concurred with this assessment.  




The Partnership Agreement  
HI worked with HUMAID in designing the project proposal for the EC and signed a 
formal Partnership Agreement with HUMAID as the framework for collaboration.  The 
collaboration included budget support to HUMAID operations (salaries, equipment and 
operational costs), technical support, training and accompaniment in demining and EOD, 
and technical support, training and accompaniment in organizational / managerial areas 
(administration, finance, and logistics). 
 
HI’s Human Resource Inputs 
HI recruited a team of 2 technical advisors/trainers to train and accompany HUMAID 
intensively through the project  – a demining / EOD specialist and an administrator / 
management trainer / advisor.  The HI staffing was enhanced through the later addition 
of a third full-time technical advisor / trainer in community liaison (data collection / 
mapping) and MRE - not funded within the EC project budget. While the project team of 
3 HI advisors / trainers had other responsibilities related to managing HI’s office and 
operations in Guinea-Bissau, they were otherwise engaged full-time in project activities.  
 
Project Implementation 
The project began in January 2005, and has proceeded as per the original proposal. 
There have been delays in implementation but few programming changes and only 
minor budget revisions not requiring formal amendments to the contract with the EC. 
Nonetheless, all programmatic and budgetary revisions have been documented in 
communications with the EC and in the project Interim Narrative Report submitted to the 
EC in October 2005.  
 
The Project Evaluation 
An external final evaluation was planned and budgeted. HI has coordinated this 
evaluation in concert with the EC Delegation in Guinea-Bissau.  The Terms of Reference 
for the evaluation are attached as ANNEX A, but can be summarized as: 
 
 To assess the degree to which the project objectives have been achieved, with 
particular attention to capacity-building methodologies, efficiency, relevance and 
sustainability; 
 To provide HI with recommendations for effective project closure; and 
 To provide HI with recommendations for future capacity-building projects. 
    
This document represents the written synopsis of the evaluation. Subsequent sections 
present the Evaluation Methodology, an Overview of Project Commitments and Outputs 
To-Date, a Discussion of Findings & Lessons-Learned in Areas of Intervention, Other 
Management Considerations, an Assessment of the Project’s Relevance, an 
Assessment of Efficiency & Effectiveness, an Assessment of Sustainability & Impact,  
Conclusions & Lessons-Learned, and Recommendations.  Attached to body of the report 
are six documents including detailed accounts of the Evaluation activities, individuals 
and documents consulted, HUMAID’s production data, and a combined Self-Assessment 
and External Assessment of HUMAID’s Organizational Performance.   
 




2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
 
The approach to this evaluative exercise was a mix of technocratic assessments of 
project outputs and more interpretative assessments of project processes toward 
desired outcomes.  An effort was made to assess both the micro-workings of project 
implementation as well as the macro policy and partnership context in which the project 
was envisioned and played out. Documents were reviewed, interviews were conducted 
with key individuals one-on-one and in small groups, and training sessions, daily 
activities and partner interactions were observed over the course of 11 days in-country in 
February 2006.  A detailed program of contacts and evaluation activities is attached as 
ANNEX B, the list of individuals consulted as ANNEX C, and documents reviewed as 
ANNEX D. 
  
In evaluating organizational capacity-building aspects of the project, the Evaluator was 
informed by a number of structured “organizational self-assessment” tools developed 
and previously administered by HI with HUMAID as well as HI’s assessment of 
HUMAID’s organizational performance11. 
 
In evaluating HUMAID’s technical capacity in Mine Action as per IMAS, the Evaluator 
referred to written tests used in the training courses conducted by HI’s Demining & EOD 
Technical Advisor and the expert opinion of HI.  Observations as to HUMAID’s technical 
capacity were also received from the UNDP Chief Technical Advisor on Mine Action, and 
the Director of the CAAMI.    
 
Methodological Considerations  
 The evaluator is not a technical specialist in mine clearance and EOD, thus not 
qualified to independently assess the technical capacity of HUMAID in these 
activities (in a strictly technical sense), much less to evaluate the expertise / 
capacity of HI’s technical assistance.  Moreover, the evaluation was carried out 
during a break in the mine / UXO clearance schedule of HUMAID and it was 
impossible to observe clearance work first-hand.   
 
 It is expected that HI will provide its own evaluation of the technical capacity of 
HUMAID in mine / UXO clearance in final reporting on the project. While a certain 
degree of subjectivity and conflict of interest are inherent and unavoidable in this, 
the expert technical assessment of HI should be deemed by all parties to be valid.     
 
 The evaluator originally proposed to bring all interlocutors in the project together in 
an evaluation workshop, but HI advised that this methodology might not be the most 
appropriate given existing dynamics between and among the key players. It is the 
opinion of the evaluator (with the benefit of hindsight) that a broader forum of 
stakeholders might or might not have been more productive, but for certain some 
form of facilitated reflection involving HI and HUMAID would have been helpful in 
working through partnership tensions towards more productive collaboration and 
                                                
11 Managerial Assessment – Administrative, Human Resources, Financial, Logistics (December 2005), 
compiled by Annabelle Djeribi, HI Administrator & Logistics Coordinator / Technical Advisor to 
HUMAID. 
 




synergy through the final weeks of the project, and in sousing out project 
achievements and lessons-learned.  
 
 The technical and methodological limitations noted, the evaluator believes the inputs 
received were sufficient to address the primary objectives of the evaluation and the 
most pressing concerns of HI and HUMAID at this juncture in the life of the project.  
 




3. OVERVIEW OF PROJECT COMMITMENTS &  
OUTPUTS TO-DATE 
 
3.1  The Project Log Frame Revisited12 
 
General Objectives 
1. To reduce the risk of landmines and UXOs in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bissau.  
2. To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
Specific Objective 
Local Mine Action capacity is strengthened in Guinea-Bissau as per International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS). 
 
Verifiable Indicators Source and Means of 
Verification 
Assumptions 
1. HUMAID receives technical and   
administrative supports in the 
management of Mine Action as per 
IMAS and in coordination with 
CAAMI. 
 
2. Within 2 years HUMAID has the 
capacity to manage Mine Action 
projects as per IMAS. 
HUMAID’s Organigram. 
 




Test results from training courses. 
 
 
Political stability in the 
country so as to permit 
project implementation. 
 
CAAMI supports Mine 
Action partners. 




1.  Local 
competencies to direct 
and manage mine 
clearance activities 
are developed (within 
HUMAID). 
Preconditions: HUMAID and HI sign a partnership agreement and the 
security situation in the country is remains stable. 
At least 3 HUMAID staff are 
trained in project 
management. 
 
At least 2 additional HUMAID 
staff are trained in 





management tools are used 
by HUMAID. 
 
HUMAID develops Standing 
Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) and these are 










UNDP funds HUMAID’s 
participation in 
international training for 
mid and senior 




                                                
12 An English translation of the original project log frame in French is presented here.   








2. More effective mine 
/ UXO clearance in the 
urban and peri-urban 
areas of Bissau.  
Independent adherence to 
IMAS. 
 
53 HUMAID deminers are 
trained. 
 
At least 10 HUMAID 










CAAMI’s assessment of 
HUMAID results and 
impact corresponds to 
that of HUMAID and the 
reality on the ground. 
3. Improved 
coordination between 
HUMAID and the 
CAAMI. 
HUMAID submits regular and 
satisfactory reports to the 
CAAMI. 
 
CAAMI sends other trainees 
to participate in project 
training sessions. 
 
Space for collective analysis 
of Mine Action in Guinea-
Bissau. 
 









HUMAID is accredited 
by the CAAMI. 
Activities 
 
Activities for Result #1 -  Local 
competencies to direct and manage 
mine clearance activities are 
developed (within HUMAID).  
Inputs  Assumptions 
1.1 Recruit a Deputy Director for 
HUMAID. 
 
1.2 Training or HUMAID in project 
management and fundraising. 
 
1.3 Training or HUMAID in 
bookkeeping and financial 
management. 
 
1.4 Establish administrative, financial 
and human resource systems  
within HUMAID. 
 
1.5 Develop HUMAID’s Standing 








The Training Dept. of HI. 
 
Training mission from HI 
Brussels. 
 
1 monitoring mission by 
HI’s Finance Dept. 
 
1 HI Technical Advisor. 
 
1 HI Administrator / Trainer. 
The existence of potential English 
speaking candidates for the position 
of Deputy Director of HUMAID. 
 
UNDP funds mid-senior 
management training for Mine 
Action. 
 
Approval of HUMAID’s SOPs by the 
CNDH and CAAMI. 




Activities for Result # 2 – 
More effective mine / UXO 
clearance in the urban and peri-
urban areas of Bissau. 
Inputs Assumptions 
2.1 Training in IMAS. 
 
2.2 Training sessions for  
      HUMAID on survey 
      techniques, data collection, 
      MRE, EOD, use of mine 
      detection dogs, and 
      mechanical demining. 
 
2.3 Technical accompaniment    
      and supervision in the field. 
 
2.4 Create and operationalize 2 
      EOD teams. 
 
2.5 Equip HUMAID with the 
      necessary vehicles and 
     materials for clearance 
     activities. 
 
2.6 Train, equip and establish a 
      Community Liaison team to      
      facilitate clearance activities, 
      carry out MRE and collect   
      data on dangerous areas. 
 
1 HI Technical Advisor. 
 





Mine detection dog team. 
 
Machine for clearing 
brush. 
Support mission by HI 
Logistics Dept. 
 
1 pick-up vehicle. 
 
Clearance materials and 
equipment. 
 
Support from HI’s 
PEPAM Dept. 
 
10 EOD staff from 
HUMAID. 
 
5 Community Liaison staff 
from HUMAID. 
 
The GICHD carries out a training mission 
on IMSMA in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
The CAAMI supports and monitors the 
training being conducted. 
 
ANDES participates in the training on 
MRE along with the HI PEPAM Dept. and 
assists in establishing the HUMAID 
Community Liaison team. 
 
There are no serious dog illnesses in 
Guinea-Bissau. 
 
The mechanical clearance machine is 
funded by a European donor. 
 
The CAAMI undertakes quality control of 
all clearance activities. 
 
Switzerland provides micro-charges for 
EOD. 
 
The Ministry of Transport facilitates the 
entry of project materials into the country. 
 
The Ministry of Defense authorizes the 
storage of explosives for EOD. 
 
Activities for Result # 3 – 
Improved coordination between 
HUMAID and the CAAMI. 
Inputs Assumptions 
3.1 Improve the quantity and quality 
      of reports submitted by HUMAID 
      to the CAAMI in support of 
      national data collection and  
      coordination. 
 
3.2 Facilitate HUMAID’s participation 
      in collective work on national   
      Mine Action Standards. 
 
3.3 Include other Mine Action actors 
in technical training by / through  
the CAAMI. 
 
3.4 Contribute to a Landmine Impact 
study in close collaboration with 
other Mine Action actors in 
Guinea-Bissau. 
 






The HUMAID reports to the CAAMI are 
found to be acceptable. 
 
The CAAMI organizes work sessions on 
national Mine Action Standards. 
 
The CAAMI and LUTCAM show interest in 
the trainings organized by HI for HUMAID. 
 
The CAAMI supports an impact study. 




3.2 Activities & Outputs To-Date 
 
 
Activities for Result #1 -  Local competencies to direct and manage mine clearance activities 





YES / NO 
Importance in 
Achieving Desired 
Result  1-5 13 
(1 = not very, 5 = 
very important) 
1.1 Recruit a 
Deputy Director for 
HUMAID. 
 
NO, but efforts made to encourage and assist HUMAID to re-
structure internally towards the same objective.  Changes in 
strategy were documented and communicated to the EC in the 






1.2 Training for 




YES, in part.  3 HUMAID staff trained. 
 
In May 2005, HI brought a resource person from Brussels 
(Alexandra Mege) to lead an intensive training workshop on 
fundraising and program development (May 30 – June 3, 2005).   
 
As a follow-up to the fundraising workshop, HI organized an 
exploratory fundraising trip with HUMAID to Dakar in October 2005 
with the objective of meeting prospective donors.     
 
In November 2005, HI organized a week-long intensive training 
workshop on project methodology facilitated by a HI resource 
person from the regional office in Burkina Faso (Bartelomey 
Batieno). 
 
HUMAID did not send a senior staff person to the international 
Mine Action project management training course in Thailand in 












YES, in part.  1 HUMAID staff accompanied. 
 
Formal training not required. Accompaniment provided 
in budget development, financial monitoring and 
reporting. 
 
HI also provided extensive hands-on financial 
management support in ensuring project accountability 
vis-à-vis the EC. 
3/5 
From the perspective of 
achieving desired outcomes in 
terms of reduced risk and more 
effective Mine Action, attention 
to financial management was 
not critical. However, from the 
perspective of financial 
management and accountability 
to the EC as per required 
norms, accompaniment in this 
area was essential.  
                                                
13 Note that this assessment of “importance” is that of the Evaluator.  Some activities were seen to be 
essential to achieving the desired outcomes while other activities were assessed as less vital to achieving 
the desired outcomes.  This scoring is not an assessment of the degree to which HI or the project was 
successful in carrying out the activities --- observations on this are included in subsequent sections of the 
report, but rather, an assessment of the degree to which the chosen activities were important to meeting the 
desired results.  




Planned Activity Carried Out 











YES, in part 
 
The HI-HUMAID Partnership Agreement established a Project 
Management Committee that met monthly to coordinate project 
activities and to provide a forum for HI’s technical assistance and 
accompaniment on administrative and managerial issues.   
 
HI’s strategy for organizational development included a participatory 
base-line assessment of the state of affairs in administration, 
finance, human resources and logistics and to compile an 
Organizational Assessment document that would set the stage for 
on-going technical assistance and organizational development. To 
this end HI organized and facilitated a series of 2-day workshops 
with HUMAID on related aspects such as the HI-HUMAID 
Partnership Agreement, organizational structure and Organigram, 
job descriptions, etc, culminating in the presentation of the 




Not because these 
systems are not 
important per se 
but because 
HUMAID had basic 
procedures in place 













Both HI and HUMAID recognize the importance of developing 
organizational SOPs for HUMAID.  To date these SOPs have not 
been developed --- and remain a priority in the final weeks of the 
project.  
 
HI also noted the intention in the mid-term narrative report to the EC 
to provide support to the CAAMI in developing national operating 
standards as a locally adapted version of the IMAS.  This work also 








Activities for Result # 2 – More effective mine / UXO clearance in the urban and peri-urban areas 
of Bissau. 
 
2.1 Training in 
IMAS. 
 
YES, 60 HUMAID field staff trained. 
 
In early 2005, at the start of the project, the HI Technical Advisor 
assessed the competencies of 60 HUMAID deminers, group leaders, 
paramedics, supervisors, quality control monitors and Community 
Liaison workers during the regularly scheduled refresher training 
course.  At this time it was deemed necessary to extend the 
refresher training by an additional two weeks (February 2-18, 2005).  
The training included both theoretical and practical elements. HI 
assessed competencies in written and practical tests. 
 
A second refresher training course for HUMAID deminers, group 
leaders, paramedics, supervisors, quality control monitors and 
paramedics was carried out in September / October 2005. 
 
The original proposal to introduce mine detection dogs was 
abandoned early in the project as simply not viable.  Similarly, the 








Besides questions of technical appropriateness and suitability to the 
clearance terrain and tasks, there was no budget support for these 
activities within the project. 
 
As reported by HI to the EC in the interim narrative report, HI 




HUMAID on survey 
techniques, data  
collection, MRE, 
EOD, use of mine 




In part.   
 
In addition to training in MRE provided by the HI Community Liaison 
Technical Advisor, HI sent a MRE specialist from HI headquarters 
(Sophie Bonichon) in August 2005 to train the HUMAID Community 
Liaison team in MRE and community liaison and to provide technical 
support to developing a Community Liaison Strategy and work plan 
for 2005.  
 
After long procurement delays, HI acquired GPS devices and  
compasses for training in survey techniques and mapping which was 
carried out in January/February 2006. 
 
As noted above, mine detection dogs and mechanical demining 











HI provided regular accompaniment and supervision to HUMAID 
deminers on-the-job.   
 
Early in the project, HI also attended weekly technical coordination 
meetings held by HUMAID. 
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There were delays in implementing EOD training.  The first training 
session was held August 8 -19, 2005 with 10 HUMAID deminers, 10 
LUTCAM deminers and 2 CAAMI participants. HUMAID and 
LUTCAM deminers were selected for the course using a written test 
developed by HI. The top 10 participated.  CAAMI provided the 
training room and meals but was not able to secure the necessary 
explosives for the practical training.  
 
The practical EOD training was only carried out in February 2006. 
 
The plan was to form an EOD team of 6 people in HUMAID and 




2.5 Equip HUMAID 







Some changes were made to the original plan for procurement, and 
these changes were documented and communicated to the EC.  No 
changes required formal amendments to the contractual agreement 
with the EC.   
 
Most procurement orders were processed by June 2005, but 
requests for exceptions to the rules of origin requirements resulted in 
long delays in procurement.  
 
3 
HUMAID had a 




prior to and through 
most of the project 
period. 




Planned Activity Carried Out 




2.6 Train, equip 
and establish a 
Community Liaison 
team to facilitate 
clearance activities, 
carry out MRE and 
collect data on 
dangerous areas. 
 
YES, 5 HUMAID staff trained. 
 
HI brought in a 3
rd
 Technical Advisor position outside the project budget 
who worked to support the HUMAID Community Liaison team provide 
information to communities on clearance activities, collect data on 
dangerous areas (primarily UXO contamination) and educate the public to 
reduce the threat of mine / UXO incidents.   
 
The HI Technical Advisor developed job descriptions for the CL team, 
evaluated the competencies of existing team members, recommended 
restructuring the team, coordinated the recruitment of new CL staff, 
developed a training plan, and trained the team in participatory techniques 
(June 14, 2005), PEPAM (July 7/8, 2005), data collection and mapping 
(July/August, 2005).   
    
As noted, in August 2005 a PEPAM specialist from HI France carried out a 
2-week training course on MRE and community mapping, and assisted in 





Activities for Result # 3 – Improved coordination between HUMAID and the CAAMI. 
 
3.1  Improve the 
quantity and quality of 
reports submitted by 
HUMAID to the CAAMI 
in support of national 
data collection and 
coordination. 
YES, in part 
 
Through the life of the project HUMAID submitted monthly 
reports to the CAAMI. Some improvements in the quality of the 







in collective work on 





Was to be done in early 2006 but has not happened. 
          
4 
3.3 Include other 
Mine Action actors in 
technical training by / 
through the CAAMI. 
 
YES – with EOD training 
 
HI took the position that “each demining NGO carries out 
demining training independently” such that manual demining 
training facilitated by HI was carried out only with HUMAID. 
 
EOD training was coordinated through the CAAMI and 
participants were selected from both HUMAID and LUTCAM. 
CAAMI Quality Control Monitors were also asked to participate.   
 
4 
3.4 Contribute to a 
Landmine Impact study 
in close collaboration 






This activity depends on the CAAMI, and it is not clear to what 
degree HI or HUMAID could have contributed or participated 
within the budgetary and programmatic confines of the project 
had an Impact Survey been implemented during the life of the 
project. 
2 
Given the project 
focus on Bissau 
where the clearance 
tasks were/are 
delineated, this 
activity would seem 
to fall outside the 
scope of the project 




4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS & LESSONS-LEARNED 
        IN AREAS OF INTERVENTION  
 




Capacity-Building Approach & Priorities 
HUMAID’s Management Capacity 
HI Accompaniment 
The Workshops 
Budget Support & Financial Management 
Procurement & Logistics 







 HI fulfilled its contractual obligations to provide administrative, financial and logistical 
training and accompaniment to HUMAID as per the proposal submitted to, and 
funded by the EC.   
 
 Three HI technical advisors provided full-time capacity-building support to HUMAID, 
over and above the two advisors originally envisioned and funded within the project 
budget. While only one of the three advisors was dedicated to administrative and 
managerial training and accompaniment on a regular basis, the third full-time staff 
person represents a significant additional investment by HI toward completion of 
project objectives.    
 
 The project budget covered HUMAID salaries and operational costs for 2005. 
Outside the project budget, HI partially funded HUMAID salaries for the final three 
months of the project - January to March 2006.  This additional budgetary support to 
HUMAID is critical in that it allowed HUMAID to remain operational and project 
activities to continue through the life of the project.    
 
 HI’s organizational capacity-building strategy included: 1) administrative, financial 
and logistical accompaniment, 2) facilitating a series of workshops on organizational 
development themes, 3) compiling an Organizational Assessment document, 4) 
providing external HI resource people for week-long intensive training workshops on 
project management and fundraising, and 5) international training in Mine Action 
Project Management for a HUMAID senior manager.  Except for the failure of 
HUMAID to participate in international management training, all other components 
of the organizational capacity-building strategy proceeded as planned.   
 
 HI’s training and accompaniment of HUMAID resulted in improved administrative 
systems, information systems, logistics, budget monitoring and reporting.   





 The potential results of the capacity-building strategy were not fully realized due to a 
number of factors including: HUMAID’s resistance to change; HUMAID’s limited 
engagement with HI towards organizational development objectives; HI’s 
technocratic approach to training and accompaniment; the lack of strategic 
leadership within HUMAID and the lack of strategic engagement by HI to address 
HUMAID’s strategic needs; HI’s steadfast determination to stick with the plan; 
limited human resources; and limited time. 
 
 The 15-month project timeframe was too short to achieve the desired capacity-
building results.   
 
 Both HI and HUMAID found the dual role of the HI Administrator / Technical Advisor 
as an advisor/trainer and as a financial controller/manager to be uncomfortable and 
a hindrance to capacity-building objectives. HI believed that the two functions were 
methodologically incompatible and needed to be separated in different positions.    
 
 It was important for HI to avoid doing the work for HUMAID.  Instead of working 
together with HUMAID, HI set themselves apart as advisors and trainers. HUMAID 
was instructed and then regularly failed to execute as instructed.  HI monitored and 
documented HUMAID’s lack of progress.  Had HI spent more time working together 
with HUMAID, mentoring by example and providing on-the-job accompaniment, 
there probably would have been greater synergy toward project objectives.   
 
 If the implicit objective of HUMAID’s capacity-building was to ensure organizational 
survival (and by extension a sustainable local Mine Action capacity), then 
developing strategic leadership within HUMAID and supporting HUMAID in 
occupying ‘political’ space as the preeminent mine clearance NGO in Guinea-Bissau 
should have been a priority for HI.  Developing strategic leadership would have 
required a different approach by HI in organizational training and accompaniment.   
 
 Most of HI’s capacity-building strategy was technically sound and well-executed at a 
micro-level but did not resonate with HUMAID or address HUMAID’s strategic 
priorities.  It needed to be OK for HI to change course mid-way and to adapt the 
capacity-building strategy and work plan in accordance with what was working and 
not working with HUMAID and contributing to the desired results.   
 
 If at the end of the project HUMAID finds itself without funding to continue and little 
‘political’ support to continue, one has to question whether all the technically good 
administrative and managerial training really mattered.  In this light, the HUMAID 
Directors’ limited engagement in the project and resistance to most capacity-building 
aspects is not constructive, but is understandable.   
 










Capacity-Building Approach & Priorities 
 HUMAID’s Director did not consider administrative and managerial accompaniment 
necessary, evidenced by HUMAID’s history of securing funds and producing results, 
and therefore did not foster an environment in which the HUMAID staff proactively 
engaged with HI towards organizational development objectives. Although the 
Partnership Agreement signed between HI and HUMAID outlined collaboration in 
capacity-building activities, the fundamental difference in perception and priorities 
guaranteed tension.   
 
 Given the low-level tension and obvious passive resistance by HUMAID to 
managerial supports HI needed to bring the HUMAID leadership to the table to 
hash-out a shared vision and to jointly determine where to focus energies. In the 
end, this may have led to a different capacity-building work-plan more closely 
aligned with HUMAID priorities and strategic interests, which in turn would have 
resulted in a higher degree of engagement on the part of HUMAID.  This is not to 
say, critical administrative, finance, logistics and human resource supports should 
have all been ignored, but that the investment of time and energy should have 
principally been focused on strategic work serving HUMAID’s  medium-term 
interests.  
 
 HI identified the need to strengthen strategic leadership within HUMAID, but in 
practice, focused training and accompaniment more on managerial skills and 
administrative systems rather than positioning HUMAID for medium term 
sustainability in Mine Action.   
 
 HI did organize a fundraising / profile-raising trip with HUMAID to Dakar,Senegal in 
October 2005. The trip did not result in any concrete funding opportunities for 
HUMAID, which HI attributes to HUMAID’s lack of preparation (poor documentation 
and presentation), as much as the general lack of donor interest in Guinea-Bissau.  
HI expressed frustration with HUMAID’s lack of follow-through given all the supports 
that HI did give to HUMAID in preparation for the trip (assistance in developing a 
concept note with budget and donor-briefing). The Director of HUMAID, on the other 
hand, does not acknowledge any short-comings on HUMAID’s part, and questions 
the value-added of HI in fundraising.   Objectively, one can observe that, indeed, 
HUMAID was not well-prepared and did not present well.  The organization did not 
and still does not have an updated brochure, marketing materials or targeted 
concept papers.  While one can appreciate HI’s stance as an advisor vs “do-er”, in 
this instance, more direct collaboration and channeling of HI’s technical assistance 
and supports to the marketing of HUMAID would have been strategic. 
 
 The Organizational Assessment of HUMAID was a big job for HI, resulting in an 
impressive comprehensive organizational review.  The Assessment identified 
HUMAID’s strengths and weaknesses in administration, finance, logistics and 
human resources and outlined in great detail what still needs to be done for 
HUMAID to improve. In the context of a 15-month project with no on-going funding 
secured, the investment in what could be seen to be a long “to-do list for HUMAID” 
just as their funding dries up, could be questioned.  The Assessment was well-done, 
however it is questionable as to whether this substantial investment of time and 
energy contribute in equal measure to HUMAID’s organizational sustainability, and 
by extension, to a more efficient and effective Mine Action in Guinea Bissau.    





 The Organizational Assessment could, in fact, be used by HUMAID to leverage 
funding if HI was to assist HUMAID in formatting and packaging the Assessment 
with this objective in mind. 
 
 
HUMAID’s Management Capacity 
 HI considered the recruitment of a Deputy Director and the re-organization of 
existing human resources within HUMAID to be critical to developing management 
and leadership capacity within the organization. The Director of HUMAID rejected 
the planned recruitment of a new Deputy, preferring to strengthen the capacity of 
the existing senior management team.  The Head of Operations, with a grade nine 
education, who had been the de facto Deputy formally assumed this role within 
HUMAID.   
 
 HI worked closely with the Deputy Director to build his management capacity and an 
intensive 6-month English course was provided in the hope he would acquire the 
language skills necessary to access international training, work with project 
documentation and inter-face with international donors. To date, the language 
classes have not been particularly successful. 
 
 HI experienced resistance on the part of the HUMAID Director to developing Bissau-
Guinean leadership within HUMAID.  
 
 It was assumed that UNDP would fund the participation of a HUMAID delegate to 
the international Mine Action Management training course organized by Cranfield 
University.  UNDP did offer to subsidize HUMAID’s participation in the course held 
in Thailand in September / October 2005, but much to the dismay of HI, HUMAID 
did not participate in the course.  The need for management training was simply not 
prioritized by HUMAID’s Director who does not acknowledge the significance of the 
lost training opportunity. Members of HUMAID”s senior management team, on the 




 The decision by HI to maintain a separate office rather than have the technical 
advisors be based within HUMAID has arguments for and against.  In retrospect, it 
may have been more effective to have established counterpart / mentoring roles in-
house within HUMAID. The accompaniment would have been more fluid and there 
would have been more “working together” rather than accompaniment as an activity 
in and of itself separate from the productive work day-to-day. Given the short 
timeframe for the project, working together in the same physical space day-to-day 
may have also moved things forward at a quicker pace. 
 
 HI required that HUMAID submit written requests for the kinds of technical 
assistance and training that could have been undertaken in a more informal, day-to-
day fashion had HI advisors been working in the same physical space. For example, 
the need for tutoring in Excel was identified early in the project but has not 
happened because HI is still waiting for HUMAID’s written request for this training. 




This anecdotal example serves to highlight how differences in communication styles 
and ways of working hindered progress. Given HUMAID’s ‘ways of working’, 
accompaniment ‘as a process rather than an event’ may have been more 
productive. 
 
 The Partnership Agreement established a Project Management Committee that met 
monthly and served as a forum to coordinate project activities and to facilitate  
communications between HI and HUMAID and internally within HUMAID.  HUMAID 
insisted that internal communications were never an issue, but there is ample 
evidence to suggest this is not the case and that the Project Management 
Committee helped to alleviate some of the communication deficits.     
 
 Had HI technical advisors been based in HUMAID’s office, many of the operational 
issues dealt with in the monthly Project Management Committee meetings would 
have likely been coordinated in day-to-day contacts, and other periodic meetings of 
the Technical and Administrative staff. The Management meetings could have then 




 HUMAID insisted that the HI workshop approach was “textbook training” and “not so 
helpful”; that  “HI was not responsive to HUMAID’s input” in terms of training 
priorities and approaches; that scheduling was determined by HI and inflexible; and 
that HI was too directive.  One can observe that the workshop methodology and 
content was largely pre-packaged by HI and participation was limited to filling in the 
blanks.  On the other hand, HI repeatedly changed the dates of workshops to 
facilitate HUMAID’s participation and actively solicited HUMAID’s input and 
feedback on training modules. HI also developed preparatory materials, 
documented the workshops and produced follow-up documents (in English).   
 
 HI further brought in additional resource people from headquarters and the West 
Africa regional office for two 5-day workshops on project management and 
fundraising. The pedagogic materials produced for these workshops were excellent 
and the workshops were positively evaluated by the HUMAID participants - except 
for the concern that the intensive full-time nature of the training did not permit 
HUMAID managers to attend to day-to-day operational demands.  
 
 Despite, HI’s best efforts to provide quality training opportunities, The workshops 
came to be regarded by the HUMAID leadership as interruptions in the work-plan. 
As a result HUMAID did not engage in the workshops in a strategic way, opting 
instead to minimally participate, filling in the blanks as directed.   
 
 
Budget Support & Financial Management 
 HI facilitated a participatory process with HUMAID to revisit and revise the project 
budget at the start of the project as some time had passed since the original budget 




was developed. HI communicated all line item changes to the EC (though none 
required formal amendments to the HI-EC contract14).  
 
 Budget support to HUMAID averaged €38,747 per month over 2005 of which 
approximately 75% was personnel costs covering the 77 HUMAID staff. HUMAID 
had negotiated substantial salary support at what is most likely an unsustainable 
level.  HUMAID deminers were paid considerably more than their counterparts in 
LUTCAM15.  The discrepancies in salaries between HUMAID and LUTCAM led the 
CAAMI to work on an updated national salary scale in an effort to standardize 
salaries.     
 
 As of January 2006, the EC budget for HUMAID salaries was fully expended and HI 
offered to cover partial salary costs to the end of the project. In effect the reduced 
funds forced a strategic discussion on salaries but the HUMAID leadership has not 
fully grappled with the issue. The salary of the Director, in particular, presents many 
questions that HUMAID has avoided and may not effectively address unless / until 
the governing body of the organization is brought into the discussion. 
 
 The budget support for HUMAID was detailed and restricted. Every expenditure 
required pre-approval by HI.  HI directly administered the budget and documented 
any changes to approved expenditures, even as small as €15, in formal 
amendments to the HI-HUMAID Partnership Agreement.  This level of budgetary 
control was justified by the level of detail in the original budget proposal to the EC 
and by HI’s direct procurement of project materials and the need to avoid over-lap 
and confusion.   
 
 Final detailed reporting on expenditures was not available at the time of the 
Evaluation, but interim reporting would suggest that the project budget has been 
fully expended and tightly controlled as per approved line items. 
 
 The project budget included minimal office and running costs for both HUMAID and 
HI. The difference for HUMAID, however, was that they had no other sources of 
funding to complement the project budget, while HI did.  Apparently, no efforts were 
made by HUMAID and/or HI during the year to secure additional funding for 
HUMAID’s running costs.   
 
 The HUMAID Finance Manager is relatively well-qualified and experienced.  Formal 
training in bookkeeping was not necessary.  HI did, however, provide regular 
accompaniment and supervision to HUMAID’s Finance Manager, introducing 
improvements in systems and procedures.  
 
                                                
14 As reported by HI. It was beyond the scope of the Evaluation to verify financial details. 
15 In 2000 the CAAMI negotiated a salary scale for HUMAID, presumably to facilitate short-term UNDP 
budget support.  HUMAID presented a proposal with very high salaries but settled on a salary scale more in 
line with national realities. At the time deminers were paid $250.  By 2004, HUMAID deminers were being 
paid approx. €300  in local currency (200,000 CFA) while LUTCAM deminers were making approx.  €200  
(132,000 CFA).  Salary differentials for senior field staff and management staff were even more 
pronounced.  The HUMAID Director’s salary is higher than some Country Director positions for large 
international Mine Action NGOs.  




 From the donor perspective, the project budget was very well-managed. However 
one could question whether HI’s budgetary controls allowed HUMAID to develop 
capacity in budget management or donor reporting.  
 
 
Procurement & Logistics 
 The project budget included close to €100,000 for Materials and Equipment, of 
which some €65,000 were earmarked for demining materials and equipment for 
HUMAID.  Most of these materials and equipment had to be procured 
internationally.  
 
 International procurement was administered by HI. Local procurement carried out by 
HUMAID was closely monitored.  As noted previously, HI documented all approved 
expenditures in formal amendments to the HI-HUMAID Partnership Agreement.  
 
 Requests for exceptions to the EC rules of origin requirements resulted in lengthy 
delays in procurement. The bulk of project materials and equipment were delivered 
to HUMAID during the external evaluation in the last month of the project.  The EC 
in Guinea-Bissau acknowledged that these delays in processing approvals for 
exceptions were a constraint to project implementation.  
 
 HUMAID stated that they did not have the information on the international suppliers 
and were not involved in procurement handled by HI.  This calls into question 
whether HUMAID was strengthened in its capacity to procure independently after 
the project.  The objectives of efficiency and effectiveness might outweigh capacity-
building objectives and therefore justify HI’s handling of international procurement. 
However, the long delays meant that neither capacity-building nor efficiency 
objectives were met.   
 
 HI worked with HUMAID to improve internal logistics systems and procedures and 
identified the need for a dedicated Logistics Officer.  Given limited funding, HUMAID 
was unable to recruit a new Logistics Officer and did not consider it enough of a 
priority to re-structure other positions to ensure a dedicated position. 
 
 Given HUMAID’s operational capacity, the internal logistics somehow functioned / 
function. That said, one could observe the need for on-going technical support and 
accompaniment. Inventory documents are incomplete and without dates, store 
rooms are completely unorganized and systematic stock controls are just being 
introduced.   
 
 
HUMAID’s Organizational Structure  
 HI identified HUMAID’s organizational structure as a problem and considerable time 
and energy was invested in assisting HUMAID re-structure, develop an new 
Organigram and update job descriptions. HUMAID staff commented that it helped to 
have greater clarity on roles and responsibilities.  The HUMAID Director, however, 
felt the work was unnecessary as “everyone knows what their job is” and “we just 
changed the titles, but everything is the same”.  
 






 HUMAID has a Board of Directors (Mesa da Assembleia) of some repute, including 
an ex-President, judge, President of the Electoral Commission, etc.  Unfortunately, 
this governing body appears to exist on paper only. Though comments were made 
by the Director of the CAAMI to the effect that influential people are actively backing 
HUMAID, HI could not observe any practical (or political) benefits to HUMAID as a 
result of its well-connected Board of Directors. Through the life of the project, the 
Board has not met and HI has had no contact with Board members.   
 
 Given the strategic challenges in Mine Action in Guinea Bissau and the critical 
moment in HUMAID’s organizational development (and survival), re-establishing a 




 Hi was systematic in documenting the terms of the HI-HUMAID partnership, all 
communications between HI and HUMAID, all project-related decisions, and all 
project activities. The paper-work produced by HI was impressive.  
 
 The HI technical advisors were able to communicate effectively in French, English 
and Portuguese.  
 
 HUMAID noted that there was a lack of “real dialogue” and that HI was sensitive to 
criticism and questioning of the capacity-building process. On the other hand, HI 
was continually frustrated by HUMAID’s lack of responsiveness and 
professionalism.   
 
 HI’s communication style, favoring written documentation over informal dialogue and 
discussion, seemed to be at odds with HUMAID’s less-structured communication 
style.  The Evaluator was left with the impression that the HI-HUMAID collaboration 
would have been more effective if the partners had just talked more, had lunch 
together, strategized together, disagreed and hashed things out on a regular basis --
- the kinds of communicating that can not be done through written memos.   
 
 The organizational capacity-building documentation and all financial documentation 
for the project was mostly in English. This might have limited HI’s objective of 
strengthening Bissau-Guinean leadership within HUMAID as, in particular, the 
Deputy Director was not able to work effectively in English. 





4.2 Technical Training & Accompaniment (Demining / 




Training in IMAS & Manual Demining 
Technical Accompaniment & Field Supervision 
EOD Training 
Standing Operating Procedures 





 The technical components of the project included 1) training in manual demining 
and IMAS, 2) day-to-day accompaniment and supervision of clearance tasks carried 
out by HUMAID, 3) data collection and mapping techniques, and 4) EOD training 
with HUMAID, LUTCAM and the CAAMI.    
 
 The technical components of the project were relatively well-understood and well-
received by HUMAID.  Unlike managerial supports that met with some resistance, 
technical supports in demining and EOD were welcomed. The HUMAID leadership 
voiced concerns about reduced productivity as a result of training, but for the most 
part, HUMAID constructively engaged with HI towards technical outcomes.  
 
 The presence of a full-time demining / EOD expert in the country provided an 
important human resource to HUMAID, to the CAAMI, and to a lesser extent to 
LUTCAM. 
 
 The HI demining / EOD expert also served as the HI Project Manager.  This double 
work-load was noted as a limitation on both fronts.  The two roles did not present 
the same challenges as those experienced by the HI Administrator and Technical 
Advisor to HUMAID on managerial issues who struggled with the incompatibilities of 
the trainer/controller roles, but there were challenges nonetheless.  
 
 The degree to which HUMAID and the CAAMI took full advantage of the HI 
Technical Trainer / Advisor for maximum value-added could be questioned.  The 
delays in establishing the basic conditions for EOD training, not moving ahead with 
adapting national Mine Action Standards, delays in developing Standing Operating 
Procedures for HUMAID…are some examples of the HI human resource not being 
used to full advantage. 
 
 
Training in IMAS & Manual Demining 
 At the start of the project in January 2005 the HI Technical Advisor decided to 
extend the demining “refresher” training underway by an additional two weeks to 




address a number of immediate safety and technical concerns.  At the time, HI 
assessed the need for technical training and field supervision as “urgent”.  
 
 HUMAID deminers were assessed in written and practical tests. The average score 
on the written test was 13/20.  Of the 47 written tests only 12 (25%) scored 12 or 
more out of 20. Of the 25 (51%) who scored under 10/20, 13 (27%) could not do the 
test at all because of illiteracy. 
 
 Of the 38 HUMAID deminers, 26 (68%) were born before 1960 and 5 (13%) before 
1950. There is a definite correlation between age and literacy.  31 of 38 (82%) have 
less than a 6th grade education and are functionally illiterate.  Some are unable to 
even write their name. A particular challenge for technical training in HUMAID’s 
case is the fact that the Field Supervisor and Assistant Supervisor are both among 
the older war veterans and functionally illiterate. This challenging training context 
was further complicated by language --- the dominant common language is Creole 
and not all demining staff speaks or writes Portuguese.   
 
 The HI Technical Advisor had to adapt training materials and methodologies to 
counter these language and literacy barriers.       
 
 Communication issues related to language and literacy were not assessed as 
problematic by HUMAID. For the most part training was conducted in Portuguese 
(although audio-visual materials were provided in English, French and Portuguese) 
and efforts were made to include translation into Creole when necessary and verbal 
testing for those deminers unable to read and write. 
 
 The basic deminer training courses facilitated by the HI Technical Advisor 
introduced new techniques as per IMAS. HUMAID deminers noted three areas in 
which they had adopted new and improved techniques:  1) kneeling instead of 
standing, 2) security spacing and marking, and 3) the timing of rotations.   
 
 Although the Director of HUMAID downplayed the importance of new techniques, 
the deminers themselves welcomed the training saying “we feel safer now” and “we 
learned a lot with HI” and “the project should continue”. HUMAID field staff also 
commented that “we used to spend a lot of money on clearance supplies” but the HI 
Technical Advisor “helped us use materials more efficiently”. 
 
 HUMAID deminers, team leaders and field supervisors appear well-versed in IMAS 
(noting that the application of this knowledge could not be observed first-hand 
during the Evaluation). 
 
 The CAAMI and UNDP CTA observed that HUMAID’s technical capacity and 
adherence to IMAS significantly improved with HI technical training and 
accompaniment. 
 
 HUMAID believes it has the capacity to operate independently in manual demining 
in line with IMAS. A final assessment of technical capacity should be included in HI’s 
final reporting on the project, but it would seem there is some confidence in 
HUMAID’s capacity to carry out standard mine clearance operations independently 




with periodic refresher training and systematic quality assurance both internally and 
by the CAAMI.    
 
 
Technical Accompaniment & Field Supervision 
 Day-to-day accompaniment and supervision of clearance tasks carried out by the HI 
Technical Advisor was welcomed and valued by HUMAID’s field staff.  
 
 Given the learning challenges among a diverse group of deminers, many 
functionally illiterate with limited Portuguese (the Field Supervisors among these), 
continuous on-the-ground supervision by HI assured the systematization of 
improved practices introduced in training sessions. 
 
 HUMAID was supported in improving its storage of explosives for EOD, and 
warehousing demining materials and equipment. 
 
 HI also worked with HUMAID to establish proper procedures for medical support to 
demining operations as per IMAS. HUMAID had two ambulances prior to the project 
but project support ensured they were properly equipped and that Paramedics 
received refresher training.  
 
 As per CAAMI directives, HUMAID worked on three clearance tasks during 2005: 
Enterramento, Bor and Plaque 1. A total of 60,140 m2 were cleared.  HI monitored 
field operations on a regular basis.  
 
 At some point HI made a decision to not participate in the HUMAID Technical 
Meetings, prioritizing instead the Project Management Committee meetings. 
 
 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Training 
 EOD training was considered by all players as a major contribution of the project.  
 
 After months of delay due to complications in securing explosives through the 
CAAMI for practical demonstrations, the first phase of theoretical training got 
underway in August 2005. The explosives never materialized and the practical 
training was postponed until February 2006.  When the practical training finally did 
take place in February 2006, there were problems even at that point in securing the 
availability of the promised explosives through the CAAMI. HUMAID’s operational 
stock of explosives was used at the last minute to avoid aborting the training in the 
eleventh hour of the project.   
 
 Given that the EOD training was identified as a national Mine Action priority, and the 
project provided in-country EOD expertise for only a limited period of time, one has 
to call into question either CAAMI’s support for the project or influence vis-à-vis the 
government and military. At the end of the day the delays in securing explosives to 
carry out the training as a precursor to EOD operations represented a lost 
opportunity for Guinea-Bissau.     
 




 One could also question  whether HI was proactive and/or political enough in 
securing the conditions to move forward with the much needed training.  
 
 The strategy for EOD was to select the “best and brightest” deminers from HUMAID 
and LUTCAM to be trained and subsequently to form two EOD teams.  Each 
organization identified 15 deminers to be tested and the top 10 from each 
organization was selected to participate. The average score on the selection test for 
the top 20 candidates was 12/20.  The majority of the top scorers were the younger / 
newer demining recruits. 
 
 The Director of LUTCAM and two Quality Control Monitors from the CAAMI also 
participated in the EOD training. It would have been appropriate for the HUMAID 
Field Supervisor to also participate in the training but his illiteracy precluded this 
option.  
 
 From August 8-15, 2005 the HI Technical Advisor facilitated 40 hours of EOD 
theoretical training covering: IMAS, battlefield contamination, explosives theory, 
safety measures, submunitions, ammunitions, grenades, artillery, rockets, and 
bombs.  PowerPoints with extensive visual aids were used in the training.   
 
 HI tested the trainees during the course to measure their progress.  The first testing 
produced low scores averaging 7.4/20.  Final tests showed an average of 11.2/20 
for HUMAID trainees, 10.3/20 for LUTCAM trainees and 10.75/20 for the CAAMI 
trainees.  HUMAID’s highest score was 12.75/20.  
 
 For the EOD refresher theory and practical training held in February 2006, 12 of the 
best trainees from the August course were selected to participate, six each from 
LUTCAM and HUMAID. The training was once again held in the CAAMI training 
room, but CAAMI personnel did not participate. In terms of general support from the 
CAAMI for the EOD training, the UNDP CTA did comment that the CAAMI was not 
able to provide lunches for the second phase of the EOD training in February 2006 
as they had done for the first session in August 2005, due to budgetary restrictions.  
 
 Presumably the HI Technical Advisor will evaluate all EOD trainees and make 
recommendations to HUMAID, LUTCAM and the CAAMI as to who should be 
selected to form permanent EOD teams.  
 
 HI and the UNDP CTA have indicated that EOD requires technical supervision. 
Given the fast approaching end-date for the project and the departure of the HI EOD 
expert it is not clear how and when the EOD work will continue. 
 
 




Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
 The project proposal identified the need for HUMAID to produce Standing Operating 
Procedures in line with IMAS (and/or National Operating Procedures if they 
existed)16.  
 
 All parties agree that the SOPs were/are a priority.  HI and HUMAID lamented the 
fact that work on the SOPs had not begun to-date. HUMAID identified the SOPs as 
the priority for collaboration with HI in the final weeks of the project.    
 
 
HUMAID’s Operational Capacity 
 HUMAID believes it has the capacity to operate independently in manual demining 
in line with IMAS. A final assessment of technical capacity should be included in HI’s 
final reporting on the project, but it would seem there is confidence in HUMAID’s 
capacity to carry out standard mine clearance operations independently with 
periodic refresher training and systematic quality assurance both internally and by 




 Most of the area cleared by HUMAID before and during the project period has not 
yet been verified by the CAAMI Quality Control Monitors. Very little quality control 
seems to have been carried out during 2005.  HUMAID lamented the slow pace of 
follow-up on the part of the CAAMI. It is not clear whether this was a problem related 








HUMAID’s Community Liaison Team 





 The project proposal included training in Community Liaison (CL) and MRE. It is not 
clear how these activities would have been implemented without the addition of a 
third technical advisor outside the project budget. 
 
 The project proposal also made reference to HI and HUMAID contributing to an 
impact survey initiative but did not specify exactly how, or include budget allocations 
for training and technical assistance in this area.   
                                                
16 IMAS Standard 09.30 on EOD established that “demining organizations with an integral EOD capability 
must prepare SOPs for neutralization and disarming procedures which are appropriate to the UXO threat 
and are consistent with accepted international EOD practice.” 





 The addition of a third Technical Advisor in Community Liaison to the HI project 
team in April 2005 enabled the development of community liaison, data collection, 
mapping, and MRE capacity within HUMAID. 
 
 Data collection and training in survey techniques were supported by the HUMAID 
leadership but project interventions in other aspects of community liaison and MRE 
were not well understood nor considered a priority. 
 
 The CAAMI Director and the UNDP CTA did not appear to have a good sense of the 




HUMAID’s Community Liaison Team 
 The HI Technical Advisor in Community Liaison assessed the capacities of the 
existing CL team in HUMAID and based on this assessment recommended a re-
structuring of the team and the recruitment of new staff. 
 
 HI developed the terms of reference for CL staff and coordinated recruitment.  With 
a 4-person team in place, HI developed a training plan integrating elements of MRE, 
data collection and IMSMA, mapping techniques, and reporting on ‘dangerous 
areas’. The objectives of the CL team were to educate communities to prevent mine 
/ UXO incidents, to provide information to communities on clearance activities, and 
to collect data on mine / UXO contamination.  The CL team was provided with 
educational tools, basic materials and vests. 
 
 The work-plan for the CL team was further developed with technical support from 
HI’s Lyon-based MRE specialist during her field mission to Guinea-Bissau in August 
2005. 
 
 The place of the CL team within HUMAID’s organizational structure resulted in weak 
supervision and limited involvement by HUMAID’s senior managers in the CL work.   
In the absence of hands-on supervision, HI’s Technical Advisor for Community 
Liaison effectively assumed a coordination function vis-à-vis the CL team.  A more 
formal counterpart and mentoring arrangement with the HUMAID staff person 
responsible for the CL team would have increased the chances of the work 
continuing at the end of the project.  
 
 Better internal communication within HUMAID and between HI and HUMAID as to 
the work of the CL team would have facilitated a higher level of organizational 
‘ownership’ for the work. To a certain extent, the lack of support for CL and MRE 
activities on the part of the HUMAID leadership resulted from poor communication 










Mine Risk Education 
 HUMAID’s MRE is linked to clearance activities and a responsibility of the CL team.  
It was not expected that HUMAID would develop a comprehensive MRE strategy 
de-linked from its clearance work.   
 
 The project proposal indicated that ANDES, a previous partner NGO of HI in 
Guinea-Bissau, would be enlisted to train and mentor HUMAID staff. For a number 
of reasons ANDES was never involved in project activities. 
 
 HI developed training curricula for MRE and carried out three training courses with 
the HUMAID CL team in June, July and August 2005. These courses were well-
received by the CL team but were not mentioned in HUMAID’s monthly reports to 
the CAAMI. 
 
 The HI MRE Specialist from Lyon provided two full days of training in MRE in 
August 2005.   
 
 Albeit limited in scope, the MRE carried out by HUMAID as part of the community 
liaison work over the course of the project might be the only MRE undertaken in 
Guinea-Bissau during 2005.  
 
 Given project investments in training, program coordination and accompaniment in 
this area it would be a lost opportunity if HUMAID was to remain out of the MRE 
loop. While it remains a responsibility of HUMAID to pursue this engagement in 
MRE, it behooves HI to ensure there is some form of facilitated discussion so as to 
delineate HUMAID’s current MRE capacities and future directions. Current work on 
national MRE strategies coordinated by the CAAMI (with UNDP support) provides 
an important opportunity for HUMAID to contribute its experience and participate in 
program development, further enhancing the impact of the project 
 




 In January and February 2005 HUMAID staff was trained in IMSMA by the CAAMI 
and visiting specialists from the GICHD. Members of the CL team were not among 
the HUMAID staff trained. 
   
 HI worked with the CL team to identify ‘dangerous areas’ and to complete IMSMA 
forms.  IMSMA forms identifying and mapping the location of UXO were regularly 
submitted by HUMAID to the CAAMI over 2005. No IMSMA reports have been 
produced by the CAAMI indicating that this data has been used in determining 
clearance priorities. The UNDP CTA has advised HUMAID that the latest version of 
IMSMA with greater capacity to process UXO data is forthcoming. 
 
 In September 2005, HI trained the CL team in the use of a compass, establishing 
coordinates, using the GPS, and mapping.  This same training was later given to 
HUMAID field supervisors, group leaders and quality control monitors in February 
2006. 





 The HUMAID leadership recognizes the importance of data collection but has not 
ensured effective supervision and integration of the CL team in clearance activities.  
 
 










 A central objective of the project was to reduce the threat of landmines and UXO to 
the population of Bissau.  To this end, budget support was provided to HUMAID for 
clearance operations including marking and MRE, mine clearance and UXO 
disposal.  
 
 At the time the project was conceived it was expected that clearance in Bissau could 
be completed by 2005. As such, the project sought to complete clearance in Bissau.  
This goal was not realistic. That said, further progress could have been made 





 Except for periods of time when the HUMAID field staff was in training, HUMAID 
maintained clearance operations on tasks assigned by the CAAMI.   
 
 As noted, HUMAID worked on three areas in 2005 in Bissau: Bor, Enterramento and 
Plaque 1. A total of 60,140 m2 was cleared17.  
 
 Based on a contingent of 38 HUMAID deminers (supported by 21 additional field 
staff, 4 community liaison staff and 13 administrative staff), the clearance output per 
deminer averaged 1,583 m2 in 2005. With approximately 8 months of normal 
operations, the productivity per deminer was roughly 198 m2 per month or 10 m2 
per day based on full-time operations. The cost per m2 is difficult to ascertain given 
the investment in capacity-building and considerable time and human resources 
spent in training activities.  A very rough cost calculation taking the total direct 
project costs divided by metres cleared gives a cost of approximately €7.38 per m2.  
 
 The Director of HUMAID voiced concerns that the partnership with HI interfered with 
HUMAID’s productivity.  A comparison of HUMAID’s results in 2004 and 2005 or an 
                                                
17 As reported in HUMAID’s monthly reports to the CAAMI.  See ANNEX E (a and b) – HUMAID’s 
Results 2000-2005. 




overview from 2001 would support the concern that productivity declined in 2005.  In 
2004, HUMAID cleared 115,294 m2 with a budget of approximately $500,000 USD.  
The average area cleared per deminer was 3,034 m2 at an estimated cost of $4.34 
per m2.   
 
 At the same time, HUMAID’s capacity for humanitarian demining as per IMAS was 
significantly increased.  With the increasing attention to quality and security in Mine 
Action, HI assessed HUMAID’s productivity as acceptable. 
 
 
HUMAID’s Contribution in Comparative Perspective 
 The project supported roughly 50% of clearance operations in Guinea-Bissau in 
2005. 
 








Working Relations between HUMAID and the CAAMI 
Reporting 
National Mine Action Standards 
Accreditation 
National Coordination of EOD Training 





 HUMAID’s engagement in national coordination and working relations with the 
CAAMI notably improved as a result of the project and HI accompaniment. 
 
 HUMAID’s ‘weight’ in Mine Action and ability to influence the direction of national 
strategies and priorities does not seem to have increased as a result of the 
partnership with HI.  
 
 HI appears to have underestimated the importance of proactive strategic 
engagement at the national level, both for HUMAID and for HI to achieve its own 
objectives for training and technical assistance.   
 
 
Working Relations between HUMAID and the CAAMI 
 HUMAID noted that “HI helped a lot to improve relations with the CAAMI”. The new 
UNDP CTA for Mine Action was also given credit for bringing people together and 
promoting constructive working relations.  The combined effect of HI’s facilitation 









 The project sought to improve national coordination of Mine Action, primarily by 
improving HUMAID”s reporting to the CAAMI.  During the project HUMAID 
submitted monthly reports to the CAAMI on clearance activities.  Presumably the 
CAAMI has entered this data in the IMSMA and has compiled detailed reporting for 
verification.  No such reports were available for review.  
 
 The inclusion of information from and about the Community Liaison team improved 
the quality of the reports to the CAAMI, though they remained limited in their scope 
(i.e. primarily reporting on quantifiable outputs with little analysis, discussion of 
constraints, or lessons-learned).  
 
 As noted HUMAID submitted complete IMSMA forms on ‘dangerous areas’ and 
MRE activities to the CAAMI, but it is not clear whether this data has been entered 
into the database by the CAAMI  
 
 
National Mine Action Standards 
 The CAAMI has not yet worked on a national adaptation of the IMAS. In the 
meantime, Angolan and Mozambican interpretations have served as a reference 
point. 
  
 Not taking advantage of the HI demining / EOD specialist to provide technical 




 To date no formal accreditation process for Mine Action operators has been 
introduced by the CAAMI.  Neither HUMAID nor LUTCAM are formally accredited as 
per international norms. The absence of formal accreditation has not affected 
operations or the outcome of the project as clearance activities have not been 
delayed as a result.  However HUMAID, as an independent partner in Mine Action, 
remains vulnerable without this accreditation.    
 
 HI does not appear to have advocated vis-à-vis the CAAMI to ensure the 




National Coordination of EOD Training 
 HI coordinated with the CAAMI to train LUTCAM deminers and CAAMI Quality 
Control Monitors in EOD along with HUMAID deminers.  The CAAMI also provided 
logistical supports and meals during the first phase of the training.  This coordination 




ensured value-added and the best application of HI’s technical assistance and 
expertise to national objectives. 
 
 The delays in securing explosives for the practical EOD training resulted in repeated 
postponements of the training and significant time lost in a short project. In the end, 
the training was not finished in time for HI to accompany the creation of EOD teams 
within HUMAID and LUTCAM or to supervise actual EOD operations.  
 
 The fact that the CAAMI did not provide explosives for the practical training, even 
after the practical training was delayed until the final month of the project, is an 
indication that the CAAMI must be very weak in its capacity to support operations. 
At the same time it is not clear whether HI proactively engaged with the CAAMI and 
the Bissau-Guinean military to ensure availability of the explosives. 
 
 
Future Clearance Operations 
 Beyond the HI project, the future of clearance operations in Guinea-Bissau is 
uncertain.  Although the National Plan for Completion written in May 2005 affirms 
the need for the combined operational capacity of LUTCAM and HUMAID to achieve 
‘completion’ by 2009, the current funding context would indicate there is little chance 
of sufficient funding to maintain two separate clearance NGOs.  
 
 In this context, the CAAMI (and UNDP) should have facilitated some sort of open 
discussion on fundable models for clearance in 2006 and beyond.  HI should have 
assisted HUMAID in engaging strategically in this process.   
 
 Informally the CAAMI has indicated its preference for centralized funding of 
clearance operations through the CAAMI.  In this scenario, HUMAID’s future is 
doubtful ----unless there was some sort of merger with LUTCAM. There has been no 
facilitated discussion of the possible scenarios.   
 
 Given HUMAID’s vulnerability at the end of the HI project, it is surprising that HI did 
not assist HUMAID to occupy more ‘political space’ in Mine Action and to advocate 
vis-à-vis the CAAMI and UNDP on behalf of HUMAID. 
 
 




5. OTHER MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
 
5.1    Budget & Financial Considerations 
 
 A slightly revised project budget was tightly controlled and fully expended in 
compliance with EC financial and procurement restrictions18. 
 
 HI’s office and personnel costs (€163,363) represented only 24% of the total 
direct costs in the project budget, and perhaps as little as 20% of HI’s total real 
costs. In the end, HI subsidized its own office and personnel costs well beyond 
the EC project budget.  A third full-time Technical Advisor and costs associated 
with maintaining an HI office in Bissau are cases in point. 
 
 HI’s financial contribution to the project far surpassed the €138,057 contractual 
commitment. 
 
 As HI had no other programmatic activities in the country besides the project all 
additional investments by HI contributed directly or indirectly to the project.  
 
 The project budget only covered HUMAID’s salaries until December 2005, and 
HI further subsidized these personnel costs for the final three months of the 
project. 
 
 Some 76% of direct costs were allocated to HUMAID, of which 69% was 
personnel costs. The budget included only 12 months of salary for HUMAID and 
HI further subsidized HUMAID’s personnel costs for the period January to March 
2006, over and above the project budget19. 
 
 Overall, HI’s financial contribution to the project expanded the total expenditure 
well beyond the budget of €738,057, with HI’s share far exceeding the 
contractual commitment of 19%.   
 
 HUMAID’s direct costs averaged approximately €43,000 per month in 2005.  
HI’s additional funding support for HUMAID the first three months of 2006 is 
considerably less than that provided in the project budget and HUMAID was 
forced to reduce salaries and terminate contracts. 
 
 The project budget included very little organizational costs for either HI or 
HUMAID. The budget line for consumables was particularly under-funded and 
was a source of on-going tension between HUMAID and HI. 
 
 A detailed financial analysis of the project was beyond the scope of the 
Evaluation. 
 
                                                
18 Information provided by HI, but not verified.  Financial analysis was outside the scope of the Evaluation. 
19 HI’s additional funding for HUMAID January to March 2006 totals €67,560.  




5.2 HI Staffing 
 HI assembled a strong technical team in Bissau. The Director of the CAAMI 
concurred that the HI project staff was “the best HI team ever”. 
 
 The combined technical expertise of the HI staff was comprehensive and 
relevant to HUMAID’s needs and project objectives.  Notwithstanding some 
incompatibilities in communication styles and methodological approaches, HI 
staff was systematic and skilled in training.  
 
 The language skills of all three HI staff were strong.  
 
 The dual responsibilities of the HI staff vis-à-vis HUMAID and in project and 
office management limited the staff’s ability to engage in project activities.  In 
particular, the combined Project Manager / Demining & EOD Trainer/Advisor 
position limited the possible technical interventions in demining and/ EOD.   
 
 In an ideal world, HI would have also separated the Administrator position and 
the Management Advisor/Trainer position into two separate positions. 
 
 Given the strategic challenges faced by HUMAID it would have been beneficial 
if there had been HI expertise in organizational and program development, 
strategic planning, and policy advocacy, and someone who would have 
constantly linked the technical work to strategic objectives and re-framed the 
set-backs so as to continue to build momentum and synergy toward desired 
results. HI did not engage with HUMAID on issues of strategic leadership or 
with the CAAMI on issues of strategic directions in Mine Action -- the very 
issues that will determine the project’s sustainability and impact. 
 
 
5.3 EC Visibility 
 As per Article 6 of the EC General Conditions for External Actions regarding 
Visibility, project documents all carried the EC logo.  HI ensured that HUMAID 
facilities, uniforms and project materials also carried the EC logo. 
 
 A formal project inauguration ceremony was coordinated with the EC 
Delegation in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
 




6. ASSESSING THE PROJECT’S RELEVANCE 
 
6.1   Relevance to International Mine Action Policy &  





Did the EC / HI / HUMAID project correspond to current priorities in  
international Mine Action? 
Did the project promote International Mine Action Standards and best practice? 
Did the project further the Completion Initiative by contributing to “finishing the job” 
in Guinea-Bissau? 
Did the project strengthen national ownership and capacity? 





Did the EC / HI / HUMAID project correspond to current priorities in 
international Mine Action?    Did the project promote IMAS and best 
practice? 
In reducing the threat of landmines and UXO while building national capacities, and 
improving national coordination through the CAAMI, the EC funded HI partnership 
project with HUMAID is clearly situated within and subsumed under global Mine Action 
policy and practice, and is a positive contribution to the collective effort to deal with mine 
/ UXO threat in line with Mine Ban Treaty obligations, donor - and particularly EC 
priorities. 
 
Of note are the following developments in international Mine Action policy and practice, 
all of which point to the relevance of the project: 
 
 The Mine Ban Treaty with 149 States Parties (and 154 signatories/accessions) 
since 1997, including Guinea-Bissau. 
 
 Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty which states that State Parties must destroy mines 
that have already been laid in mined areas under its jurisdiction and control, “as 
soon as possible but not later than ten years” after ratifying the Convention.  
Guinea-Bissau ratified the Convention in 2001.   
 
 Article 6 of the Treaty which outlines the need for international cooperation and 
assistance in mine action, stating that “each state in a position to do so shall provide 
assistance” for Mine Action programs. 
 
 The global response and momentum in Mine Action towards Treaty obligations and 
the desired end state (be that mine-free, zero victim, or threat-free). 
 




 The UNDP-led Completion Initiative to ensure countries with relatively smaller 
landmine / UXO problems are given sufficient support to “finish the job”, understood 
as 1) clearing all high and medium impact areas of mines and ERW and 2) building 
a residual capacity so that countries can address remaining problems with little or 
no assistance from the international community.  Guinea-Bissau is included in the 
Completion Initiative. 
 
 The EC Mine Action 2002-2004 Strategy and Multi-Annual Indicative Programming 
outlining 2 priority areas:  1) reducing the threat and 2) increasing local capacity for 
efficient and effective programming, with particular mention of “management 
capacity”. 
 
 The European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target – the EC Mine Action 
Strategy and Multi-Annual Indicative Programming 2005-2007 envisioning a world 
free from the threat of anti-personnel landmines and UXOs in which all “mine 
affected countries themselves are able to take full control of their mine/UXO 
problems”.  The EC strategy seeks to define the problem as a finite one whereby 
programming moves toward the desired end-state.  The specific focus on the need 
to increase efficiency and effectiveness in mine action emphasizes local capacity-
building. 
 
 International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) developed as an operational framework 
for all Mine Action, 
 
With the specific focus on technical training, developing Standing Operating Procedures 
(SOPs), and improved quality control, the project sought to promote and extend the 
application of international standards in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
Building on their extensive international experience in Mine Action, including integrated, 
developmental and capacity-building approaches to Mine Action, HI positioned the 
project to promote best practice through the integration of Community Liaison and MRE 
in clearance activities.  
 
 
Did the project further the Completion Initiative by contributing to 
“finishing the job” in Guinea-Bissau? 
By funding approximately 50% of the clearance capacity in Guinea-Bissau in 2005 the 
project has contributed to Completion objectives. The focus on training and quality 
control in clearance did result, however, in fewer square meters cleared over 2005 than 
in previous years.  The objective of “finishing” Bissau was not attainable in the time-span 




                                                
20 Exact estimates are not available.  Based on the tasks remaining and the current clearance capacity, it is 
unlikely Bissau could be completed before the end of 2006.  Critical factors include funding for HUMAID 
and LUTCAM, but also technical assistance and material conditions to carry out EOD.  




Did the project strengthen national ownership and capacity?   Did the 
project reduce reliance on international donors and external technical 
assistance? 
Capacity-building was both the main strategy of the project and an objective unto itself 
such that HUMAID, and by extension - Guinea-Bissau would be better equipped to 
address the mine / UXO problems without long-term reliance on external assistance.  
Indeed, national capacities were strengthened and the need for external technical 
assistance reduced, though not eliminated. The total reliance on external funding 
continues.   
 
 




Was the project strategic in furthering national Mine Action priorities? 
Was the project strategic in its capacity-building objectives? i.e. did the choice of 




Was the project strategic in furthering national Mine Action priorities? 
National Mine Action priorities included the elimination of the mine / UXO threat in 
Bissau, survey to determine the exact nature of the contamination in the interior of the 
country, and completion of these clearance tasks by 2009.  Given the particular problem 
presented by UXOs, the development of national EOD capacities was identified as a 
priority.  It is expected that local operators will carry out all clearance tasks21. 
 
The HI-HUMAID partnership project - which provided budgetary and technical support to 
HUMAID to complete clearance in Bissau as per international standards, to develop 
EOD capacity in the country, and to strengthen the organizational capacity of HUMAID 
to function independently of external accompaniment, was, in every respect, strategic in 
furthering national priorities. 
  
The project also contributed indirectly to peace-building and national reconciliation 
through its constructive engagement with war veterans from both sides of recent 
conflicts, bridging gulfs in understanding among the various actors in the Mine Action 
sector, reducing the threat to civilian populations from mines and UXOs, and securing 
enhanced livelihoods for war veteran deminers. 
 
 
Was the project strategic in its capacity-building objectives? i.e. did the 
choice of HUMAID as a partner make sense? 
As no international Mine Action NGOs were present in Guinea-Bissau, strengthening 
local operational capacity was a given.  The dilemma in project design related to the 
nature of this local capacity and the choice of partner.  
 
                                                
21 The National Plan for Completion 2005-2009, prepared by UNDP (May 2005). 




In Guinea-Bissau there were two concurrent operational strategies: 1) creating and 
developing an operational arm of the national Mine Action authority (CAAMI), eventually 
evolving into a quase-independent national NGO, the strategy favored by UNDP (i.e. 
LUTCAM), and 2) strengthening the capacity of a pre-existing independent local NGO as 
a partner of the CAAMI (i.e. HUMAID) – the strategy favored by HI. 
  
One could find good arguments for and against both strategies to build local operational 
capacity22, but most agree that in the specific case of Guinea-Bissau, with its short to 
medium term mine / UXO problem (albeit with some unknowns given the lack of survey 
data outside the capital of Bissau) and limited donor engagement, that it is unlikely there 
will be sufficient on-going funding to maintain two autonomous clearance 
organizations23. That said, the National Plan for Completion 2005-2009  speaks of 
clearance of all known mined areas and remaining UXOs in Guinea-Bissau by 200824,  
depending on available funding, using national capacity in program delivery. And, to 
achieve this goal the CAAMI and UNDP have stated that Guinea-Bissau needs the 
combined operational capacity of both HUMAID and LUTCAM, or its equivalent.    
 
Given that UNDP was exclusively supporting LUTCAM both financially and with 
technical assistance and accompaniment, (leaving little room for additional partnerships 
with LUTCAM), it was logical for HI to establish a partnership with HUMAID.  One could 
argue that support for HUMAID was the most strategic choice of partners given 
HUMAID’s pre-existing organizational coherence, commitment to humanitarian demining 
and proven operational capacity.  
 
 
                                                
22 and a large school of thought suggesting that, given the finite and in many cases, short-term, nature of the 
mine / UXO problem in Guinea-Bissau, the objective of Local Operational Capacity should not be the 
focus at all but rather efficiency and effectiveness in whatever form.  Roughly interpreted, efficiency and 
effectiveness, is oft equated with bringing in the readily available and equipped international expertise to 
get the job done as quickly and qualitatively as possible.  In this case Mine Action is understood primarily 
as a humanitarian endeavor de-linked from longer-term development processes and the associated 
principles of local ownership, participation, and empowerment.  The experience on the ground has led HI 
staff to question whether capacity-building objectives might run counter to efficiency and effectiveness 
objectives and have intimated that it probably would have been more efficient and effective for HI to 
establish an operational capacity in Guinea-Bissau, using local personnel from the ranks of HUMAID and 
LUTCAM, than to build the organizational and operational capacity of these local NGOs.  At the same time 
donor and policy attention has focused on strengthening local capacity in Mine Action – to the point where 
locally driven, coordinated and executed initiatives now constitute best practice in Mine Action.  EC Mine 
Action Strategies have emphasized Local Capacity as both a vehicle towards the desired outcomes and an 
outcome, in and of itself. 
23 UNDP’s decision to create a second clearance organization entirely dependent on the CAAMI and 
UNDP instead of building on or co-opting what already existed, i.e. HUMAID, does not appear, in 
retrospect to be very strategic. While there may have been extenuating factors related to personalities and 
local politics that seemed to justify the move at the time, the end result has been inefficiencies in the use of 
limited donor resources and external technical assistance.   
24 Upon establishing the CAAMI in 2001, it was stated that Guinea-Bissau could be mine-free by 2003. 
Later this projection was extended to 2005 for the capital Bissau and 2006 for the country – the projection 
used in some measure to justify the EC funded HI initiative aimed at clearing Bissau over the January 2005 
to March 2006 timeframe.  Current projections are one more year to complete Bissau – to the end  of 2006, 
depending on EOD capacity and funding, and 3-5 years for the whole country.     









Did HI do the job right while doing the right job? 
Did the project reduce the threat of mines and UXO  
efficiently and effectively? 
Do the clearance outputs justify the project costs? 
Did the project strengthen local capacity for Mine Action  
efficiently and effectively? 
Does HUMAID’s organizational performance justify the project costs?  




Did HI do the job right while doing the right job? 
Overall HI can be said to have done the job right ---- for the most part, and therefore 
fulfilled efficiency objectives. However the assessment of whether HI did the right job is 
open to debate.  In demining and EOD training HI was widely regarded as having done 
the right job --- albeit after considerable delays.  In much of the organizational capacity-
building work HI did a good job but arguably did not do the right job. As noted, HI 
recognized early in the project that HUMAID was not fully on track but did not allow 
themselves the flexibility to change course.  The result was a disproportionate 
investment in time, energy and material resources in short-term interventions with  
limited results and no sustainability. Thus the project was mostly efficient, but less 
effective than it might have been. 
 
 
Did the project reduce the threat of mines and UXO efficiently and 
effectively?   
In the case of Bissau, clearing all suspected contamination in the short-term with existing 
operational capacity is a viable objective and a national imperative. Prioritizing clearance 
is further justified by the nature of the contamination in highly populated urban and peri-
urban areas. Marking and MRE are inadequate. The mines and UXO must be cleared.   
 
Although budget support to HUMAID ensured continued clearance operations through 
most of 2005, the project prioritized capacity-building first and foremost.  The project did 
not pursue efficiency in mine / UXO clearance, per se.  Rather, the project set out to 
strengthen local capacity as per IMAS.  Quality clearance (effectiveness) was 
considered more important than production targets (efficiency).   
 
HUMAID’s lower than usual clearance results for 2005 should be assessed in this light.  
 
HI technical assistance and on-the-ground accompaniment of HUMAID’s clearance 
operations resulted in greater efficiency in the use of materials and equipment, and in 
manual clearance techniques. 
 




Of note is the fact that HUMAID had a pre-existing operational capacity, infrastructure, 
vehicles, basic equipment and materials.  The project budget reinforced the equipment 
and materials but essentially, built upon and brought value-added to prior investments. 
In this context the EC / HI investment in HUMAID’s clearance capacity was a very 
efficient and effective use of resources. 
  
Significant delays in EOD training and the postponement of EOD operations limited the 
overall efficiency and effectiveness of the project in reducing the UXO threat.   
 
As foot-noted in a previous section of this report, many have argued that given the finite 
and short-term nature of the mine / UXO problem in Guinea-Bissau, the objective of 
efficiency should outweigh the importance of local operational capacity. And, the 
frustrations of capacity-building for local capacity led HI staff to ponder the possibilities 
had HI established an operational presence and contracted local deminers instead of 
partnering with HUMAID.  No doubt, an HI operation would have resulted in greater 
efficiencies but at the cost of reducing or eliminating local capacity.    
 
 
Do the clearance outputs justify the project costs? 
As previously noted, HUMAID expended €464,964 in 2005 and cleared a total of 60,140 
m2 with a contingent of 38 deminers, 21 additional field personnel, 4 community liaison 
staff and 13 administrative staff25.   
 
Dividing the total meters cleared by HUMAID’s direct costs gives a very rough cost 
calculation of €7.73 per m2. Calculating in total project costs including HI technical 
assistance would substantially increase the cost per m2 cleared.  Given HUMAID’s 
relatively low productivity in 2005 (as measured in m2)  compared to previous years26 
and the intensive project investments, it could be concluded from an efficiency 
perspective that clearance outputs do not justify project costs. 
 
But, it must be reiterated that capacity-building and effective clearance as per IMAS took 
precedence over productivity measured in meters cleared. 
 
 
Did the project strengthen local capacity for Mine Action efficiently and 
effectively? 
Other than HI personnel costs, which are relatively low for expatriate technical advisors, 
the project budget incorporated few material investments in organizational and technical 
capacity-building.  In this respect the project worked toward strengthening local capacity 
in Mine Action in a low-cost and efficient manner.  
 
In reality HI substantially subsidized its own operational costs.  For example, the 
decision to maintain a separate office in Bissau, however modest, rather than having the 
HI technical advisors work out of HUMAID’s office.  Even so, costs remained relatively 
low. The main investment was in personnel. 
 
                                                
25 Final reporting on expenditures may vary slightly from the figures quoted in this report.  
26 Refer to ANNEX E (a and b) for HUMAID’s Cumulative Results 2000-2005. 




The organizational capacity-building strategies implemented by HI varied in their 
effectiveness.  Administrative, financial and logistical accompaniment served project 
management purposes but did not result in greater ownership by HUMAID in improving 
systems and procedures.   Periodic workshops with HI on organizational development 
themes were not well-received by HUMAID’s leadership and did not seem to contribute 
to broader objectives.  Bringing in external resource people for intensive special 
workshops was positively evaluated but the time away from “productive work” resented.   
 
Overall HI approached capacity-building with HUMAID as a training event (the workshop 
model) rather than a process of working together (the on-the-job accompaniment 
model).  This proved to be a less effective approach with HUMAID.  There was limited 
synergy, too much down-time between ‘events’ (as HI waited for HUMAID to finish 
assignments), and lost opportunities to move forward together. 
 
The tensions around methodology were less pronounced with technical training in 
demining and EOD but language and literacy challenges would seem to point to on-the-
job training being the more effective strategy for training than workshops and formal 
classroom learning.   
 
Including LUTCAM deminers and CAAMI Quality Control staff in EOD training was an 
efficient approach.   
 
 
Does HUMAID’s organizational performance justify the project costs? 
Is HUMAID more efficient and effective as a result of the partnership with 
HI? 
(Addditional observations on HUMAID’s organizational performance can be found in 
ANNEX F – HUMAID Organizational Assessment.)  
 
HUMAID’s pre-existing organizational capacity justified the HI partnership and EC 
funding.  HUMAID was worth investing in.  The degree to which HUMAID’s 
organizational performance improved through the life of the project thereby justifying 
project costs is open to interpretation.   HI has documented HUMAID’s numerous 
organizational achievements in 2005 in administration, finance, human resources and 
logistics, and HI’s support role. In clearance activities HUMAID deminers stated that 
HUMAID is much more efficient now due to HI’s training and technical accompaniment. 
The field staff of HUMAID is well-versed in IMAS and practice has improved.  In this 
respect, clearance is now more effective. In technical work and in internal operations, 
HUMAID has shown improved organizational performance.  But do these improvements 
justify the investments a) on their own merits? and b) if HUMAID does not survive 
beyond the project?   
 
Organizational capacity-building is a medium-term process not easily force-fit into short-
term projects.  In the short-term, one could argue that HUMAID’s effectiveness should 
be measured in relation to political clout and the ability to secure on-going funding for 








8. ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY & IMPACT 
 
  The sustainability and impact of the project will depend on whether HUMAID continues to 
work, which is largely dependent on funding. As the project approaches its end-date, 
HUMAID has not secured on-going funding and there does not appear to be a survival 
strategy in place. HI has not engaged proactively with HUMAID on this issue (for 
example, by assisting HUMAID with program development, public relations, politicking, 
developing and marketing its fundraising strategy beyond 2005).  Moreover HI’s position 
on HUMAID’s future is unclear.   
  
The lack of clarity on the nature of HUMAID’s role in Mine Action vis-à-vis the CAAMI 
and LUTCAM and within the CAAMI’s strategic vision is a glaring strategic challenge. HI 
has not worked with HUMAID to build its profile as an independent NGO and partner of 
the CAAMI (as one strategy), nor does there appear to have been open discussions with 
HUMAID about possible mergers with LUTCAM or other scenarios to somehow bring 
HUMAID’s clearance capacity into the CAAMI-fold (as another strategy). Given 
comments from the Director of the CAAMI that HUMAID will “probably have to fold”, and 
behind the scenes strategizing by UNDP regarding possibly “contracting” HUMAID 
deminers to maintain operations, the urgency of addressing HUMAID’s organizational 
future is evident.  
 
If HUMAID as an independent Mine Action NGO continues, the impact of the EC / HI 
investments in capacity-building will be significant and measurable. If HUMAID deminers 
trained by HI continue to work in demining and EOD operations in any organizational 
structure or configuration, the impact will be measurable but less significant.  And, in this 
scenario, much of the EC / HI investment in capacity-building will have been for naught.  




9.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
Project Implementation & Contractual Obligations 
 The project was executed and managed by HI in accordance with EC contractual 
obligations. The original financial and programmatic commitments were fulfilled with 
few exceptions and all changes were formally communicated to the EC.  
 
 The project budget was insufficient to cover all costs necessary to fulfill 
programmatic obligations. 
 
 Project implementation would have been difficult without the third full-time technical 




 The project was well-conceived in line with international Mine Action policy & 
practice and the evolving national Mine Action strategies and operational priorities.  
 
 The project built on pre-existing local capacities and the organizational strengths of 
both the lead international partner – HI, and the local partner, HUMAID.  
 
 The decision to partner with HUMAID was strategic - though not without its inherent 
challenges, both at the partnership level and in positioning HUMAID (and the HI and 
EC investments in Mine Action) for medium-term sustainability and impact. 
 
 By funding HUMAID’s clearance operations and providing the necessary training 
and technical accompaniment to ensure adherence to IMAS, the project reduced the 
threat of mines and UXOs to the civilian population in the urban and peri-urban 
areas of Bissau.   
 
 HI provided relevant technical training and supports to HUMAID in demining, EOD, 
community liaison, MRE and survey techniques. 
 
 The technical training and organizational supports in administration, finance, 
logistics, and human resources served project management purposes but were less 
critical for HUMAID. Other kinds of organizational supports would have been more 
relevant. The focus on administrative systems rather than setting the stage for the 
continuity of HUMAID’s work stands out as a major short-coming of HI.  
 
 The project was an important investment in Guinea-Bissau’s Completion Initiative, 
and brought additional human and material resources to the benefit of national 
priorities. 
 
 The project contributed indirectly to peace-building and national reconciliation 
through its constructive engagement with war veterans from both sides of recent 




conflicts, reducing the threat to civilian populations from mines and UXOs, and 
securing enhanced livelihoods for war veteran deminers. 
 
 
Partnership & Capacity-Building 
 The partnership between HI and HUMAID was a good idea but was complicated by 
organizational cultures, personalities, ways of working, and communication styles.  
 
 HI and HUMAID lacked a shared vision for HUMAID’s future, and this was manifest 
in differences in priorities.   
 
 HUMAID wanted funds to carry out clearance operations.  HI wanted HUMAID to 
follow IMAS, re-structure and professionalize administrative systems.  What 
HUMAID most needed was to develop strategic leadership, develop programming, 
produce marketing materials, and engage strategically with the CAAMI, UNDP, 
donors and others to build profile, ‘political’ support and a funding base.  
 
 Significant language and literacy challenges were successfully managed by HI. 
 
 Technical capacity-building in demining and EOD was evaluated by HUMAID, the 
CAAMI and other external observers as successful.   
 
 
Efficiency & Effectiveness 
 Given its pre-existing organizational coherence and operational capacity, funding 
HUMAID to carry out clearance activities was an efficient and effective use of EC 




  “HUMAID emerged at the right moment, with a high level of legitimacy and 
credibility in the community, and rode the wave of Mine Action without ever having 
to perform at a high level.  On this wave, HUMAID was able to establish an 
infrastructural base and secure operational funding with relatively high salaries. Now 
that the Mine Action wave has subsided and HUMAID is left swimming around a 
very small and very crowded pool with the plug pulled out, funding won’t come so 
easily.  In this new context,  HUMAID must have  a clear vision, market a service 
and itself,, demonstrate a high level of professionalism and technical capacity, forge 
strategic alliances, and get political”.27 
 
 
Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau 
 The survival of HUMAID is good for Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.   
 
 In the coming period HUMAID’s survival is intrinsically linked to national Mine Action 
priorities and strategies established by the CAAMI with UNDP support.    
                                                
27 The Evaluators concluding comments in the HUMAID Organizational Assessment – ANNEX F. 





 In not proactively engaging in national policy and program development with the 
CAAMI and UNDP over the years and most notably over the recent project period, 
HUMAID has lost an opportunity to influence strategic directions and secure its 
future in Mine Action. HI bears some responsibility for this situation.  
 
 The National Plan for Completion 2005-2009 will require HUMAID’s clearance 
capacity or its equivalent over the medium-term.  Support for HUMAID makes more 
sense than any existing alternatives.  
 
 HUMAID’s survival will determine whether the EC / HI investments will result in 
sustainable local capacity-building toward completion objectives or will be relegated 
in history as a short-lived one-off contribution to humanitarian demining. 








10. LESSONS-LEARNED  
 
Local Capacity-Building in Mine Action 
 Mine Action is political.  Funding for Mine Action is competitive.  It is not enough to 
quietly go about one’s work.  Strategic engagement in national coordination 
structures, and with key donors and advisors to Mine Action is essential for national 
NGOs to secure a place in Mine Action. 
 
 Investments in local capacity should correspond to Mine Action objectives and 
strategies over the medium-term, or seek to influence these objectives and 
strategies in a proactive manner. 
 
 Building clearance capacity separate from an organizational sustainability and 
funding strategy is not very strategic. Why build capacity if it will never be used?   
 
 Highly developed organizational models may not be necessary for successful Mine 
Action. In Guinea-Bissau, both HUMAID and LUTCAM began operations with limited 
organizational capacity.  In the early days, HUMAID had very little organizational 
capacity with impressive clearance results.  Today LUTCAM has no independent 




Capacity-Building through Partnership  
 Both organizational partners should share the same vision of organizational 
development.  
 
 It is important to not get caught up in bureaucratic details and risk losing sight of the 
broader goals.  
 
 Partnership is an imperfect relationship. Informal and regular communications are 
essential to build consensus on strategies, priorities, methodologies and 
mechanisms for mutual accountability. 
 
 Written documentation is not enough. It is important to take the time to solicit 
feedback and talk through decisions.   
 
 Methodologies should be adapted to the organizational culture.  The experience 
with HUMAID demonstrates that more fluid, in-house, on-the-job accompaniment is 
more effective than periodic training workshops and the “textbook” approach.  
Accompaniment as a process rather than an event has proven to be more effective 
in most cases.  
 








 Normally 1-year capacity-building projects should be avoided.  When this is 
unavoidable, project objectives should be realistic and strategic.   
 
 Unless an organization can pay salaries and operational costs, nothing else will be 
important. Training and organizational development within a context of 
organizational uncertainty and funding insecurity  is always challenging.   
 
 Projects should build on what already exists and avoid superimposing new 
structures and processes. New structures and processes should be created only 
when they are absolutely necessary. The objective should be to minimize 
bureaucracy without jeopardizing accountability.   
 
 Training schedules should be flexible and oriented to partner needs.  Staff involved 
in managing operations should not be expected to train full-time without back-up 
management strategies in place. 
 
 The control and monitoring function in project management should be separate from 
the accompaniment and technical assistance functions. i.e. these tasks should be in 
two different job descriptions so as to avoid incompatible power dynamics in day-to-
day accompaniment. 
 






11.1 Recommendations to HI  
 
Project Closure 
 HI should facilitate a process with HUMAID to produce Standing Operating 
Procedures in line with IMAS. If time does not permit a finished product, HI should  
at least set out a process and provide guidance to HUMAID as to how to approach 
the task independently.  
    
 HI should support HUMAID in securing CAAMI accreditation for HUMAID.  
 
 HI should produce a written assessment of EOD capacity post-training with specific 
recommendations to HUMAID, LUTCAM and the CAAMI as to the establishment of 
EOD teams and on-going national EOD capacity.  In recommending individuals for  
EOD assignments, HI should advise HUMAID as to the short-term repercussions for 
manual demining capacity (assuming the “best and brightest” will be deemed most 
appropriate for EOD) and suggest strategies to alleviate any short-term reduction in 
demining capacity. 
 
 HI should document its expert opinion as to the external technical training and 
accompaniment required to finish EOD tasks in the city of Bissau.   The expert 
assessment of HI should be a pre-requisite for any future investment in EOD. 
 
 Given the likelihood of an impact survey in Guinea-Bissau in the near future, HI 
should coordinate with HUMAID to ensure the CAAMI is fully aware of HUMAID’s 
current and potential capacity to contribute to such an initiative. 
 
 HI should work with the HUMAID leadership to document HUMAID’s involvement in 
MRE and current organizational capacities so as to facilitate HUMAID linking into 
national program development in MRE through the CAAMI and related fundraising.   
 
 HI should orient the Community Liaison Team of HUMAID, in coordination with 
HUMAID’s leadership and the CAAMI, to ensure all contaminated areas in Bissau 
are adequately marked, with particular attention to the Paiol given its proximity to 
HUMAID’s Annex and the extent of the UXO contamination.  The rationale for this 
would be 1) as a risk-reduction priority, 2) because HUMAID appears to have a 
good stock of marking posts piled up in their Annex, and 3) to increase visibility of 
the remaining contamination in Bissau and HUMAID’s presence on-the-ground.  
Securing funding in a climate of scarce resources and competing operators usually 
has political and politicking dimensions and HUMAID would be well-served by any 
measures which increase its visibility and utility. 
 
 As a final visibility initiative, HI should work closely with the HUMAID leadership to 
organize a PR campaign in Guinea-Bissau targeting the Government, UN, donors, 
embassies, private sector and the media.  Ideally, HUMAID should have an updated 
brochure outlining accomplishments and some sort of “Info Pack” including photos, 
and the cost break-down for different types of interventions. At the very least, it 




should be possible for HUMAID to produce an updated Info Sheet and organize a 
demonstration demolition aimed to increase visibility and position HUMAID to 
fundraise.  HI’s strategic and technical accompaniment in these efforts would be 
crucial.   
 
 HI should format and package HUMAID’s organizational Assessment so that it can 
be used by HUMAID externally to leverage funding.   
 
 HI should provide whatever support is required to ensure HUMAID deals with the 
personnel contracts for 2006 and any outstanding liabilities from 2005.  Though it is 
entirely HUMAID’s legal responsibility, it would be important to avoid confusao and 
negative perceptions which would surely arise with unpaid salaries or indemnities 
following an EC / HI project.  Perceptions would become distorted….and HI would 
carry moral responsibility in the eyes of many. 
 
 HI should accompany HUMAID in the process of securing continued personnel 
insurance through the end of project. 
 
 
Future Project Development 
 HI should explore opportunities to partner with HUMAID or to channel funds to 
HUMAID to continue operations. 
 
 Any organizational supports to HUMAID should focus on strategic leadership and 
program development. 
 
 HI should challenge the current thinking within the CAAMI and UNDP which favours 
LUTCAM’s organizational survival over HUMAID. In the likely event funding is 
insufficient to maintain two clearance organizations, some form of amalgamation 
should be explored.  Barring this scenario, HI should advocate for HUMAID based 
on proven organizational and operational capacity. 
 
 HI should seek out funding to provide additional EOD training and supervision to 
EOD operations. 
 


















11.2 Recommendations to the EC  
 
Project Closure 
 The EC Delegation in Guinea-Bissau should encourage the State Secretary for 
Veterans Affairs to call a meeting of the National Humanitarian Demining 
Commission (CNHD) to review the state of affairs in mine / UXO clearance in 
Bissau, to present national priorities, and to lay out the work plan for 2006/07.  
Given the EC’s significant investment in Mine Action in 2005/06, it would be an 
important opportunity to showcase EC’s contributions while at the same time raising 
the profile of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau with Government, donors, the UN and 
media.  Increased attention to Mine Action would, in turn, be a first step in finding a 
way to “finish the job”, despite limited funds, competing priorities and donor fatigue.  
 
 The EC Delegation in Guinea-Bissau should support HI and HUMAID by 
participating in a final visibility event to wrap-up the project. 
 
 
Future Program Development 
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